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Economics Department Faculty

Gábor Virág

Assistant Professor of Economics
Office: Harkness 228
Phone: (585) 273-4821
Email: gvirag@troi.cc.rochester.edu

Ph.D. Princeton University, 2004

Research Interests: Microeconomic Theory, Applied Theory, Auction Theory

Publications:

• "Repeated common value auctions with asymmetric bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 61(1), 156-177
• "Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling," (with Jozsef Molnar) Economics Letters, 2008, 99, 360-363
• "Playing for Your Own Audience: Extremism in Two Party Elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Accepted.

Working Papers:

• "Collusive equilibria in directed search models," Revised March 2008.
• "Heterogeneous Firms in a Finite Directed Search Economy," (with Manolis Galenianos and Philipp Kircher), February 2008.
• "Competing Auctions: The Case of Finite Markets," Revised December 2007.
• "Gambling by Auctions," (with Yaron Raviv), Revised March 2007.
• "Efficiency and Competition in the Long Run: The Survival of the Unfit," June 2007.
• Old version "Stationary Auctions: The Private Values Case", January 2005
• "Skill Requirements, Search Frictions and Wage Inequality," March 2007.

Old Papers:

• "Revenue Maximizing Auctions with Market Interaction and Signaling", Revised February 2006 (with József Molnár), Working Paper.
  • Revenue maximizing auctions with externalities and signaling, September 2004.
• "Playing for Your Own Audience: Extremism in Two Party Elections", Revised February 2006 .
  • Old version, September 2004.

Teaching :

• ECO251 - Industrial Organization

Link to Theory Seminar

[Vita]