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Economics Department Faculty

Gábor Virág

Assistant Professor of Economics
Office: Harkness 222
Phone: (585) 273-4821
Email: gvirag@mail.rochester.edu

Ph.D. Princeton University, 2004

Research Interests: Microeconomic Theory, Applied Theory, Auction Theory

Publications:

• "Repeated common value auctions with asymmetric bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 61(1), 156-177
• "Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling," (with Jozsef Molnar) Economics Letters, 2008, 99, 360-363
• "Playing for Your Own Audience: Extremism in Two Party Elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2008, 10 (5), 891–922.
• "Efficiency and Competition in the Long Run: The Survival of the Unfit", accepted at Games and Economic Behavior. (online addendum)
• "Gambling by Auctions," (with Yaron Raviv), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2009, 27 (3), 369-379. (online Appendix C)

Working Papers:

• "First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders," April 2009.
• "Competing Auctions: Finite Markets and Convergence," Revised April 2009. (online Appendix)
• "Market Power and Efficiency in a Search Model" March 2009. (online Appendix)
• "Skill Requirements, Search Frictions and Wage Inequality," June 2009.

Old Papers:

• "Revenue Maximizing Auctions with Market Interaction and Signaling", Revised February 2006 (with József Molnár), Working Paper.
  • Revenue maximizing auctions with externalities and signaling, September 2004.
• "Playing for Your Own Audience: Extremism in Two Party Elections", Revised February 2006 .
  • Old version, September 2004.
• "Stationary Auctions: The Private Values Case", January 2005
• "Repeated Common Value Auctions", March 2005.
• "Gambling by Auctions," (with Yaron Raviv), March 2007.

Teaching :

• ECO251 - Industrial Organization

Link to Theory Seminar